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People v. Olivas: Equalizing the Sentencing
of Youthful Offenders With Adult Maximums
In a landmark decision, the California Supreme Court in
People v. Olivas1 held that the commitment to the California
Youth Authority of a person convicted of a misdemeanor for a
period in excess of the maximum county jail sentence that
might be imposed for the same offense was unconstitutional. It
held such commitments to be violative of the equal protection
clause of the California Constitution 2 and of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. In reaching this
result the court declared that "personal liberty" is a fundamen-
tal interest; it accordingly applied the strict scrutiny test in
reviewing the law.
The defendant, Jesus Olivas, was convicted in superior court
of misdemeanor assault.3 Misdemeanor assault carries a max-
imum county jail sentence of six months under the Penal Code.4
A discretionary sentence alternative under Welfare and Institu-
tions Code Section 1731.51 provides that a person convicted of a
public offense and under the age of 216 at the time of apprehen-
1. 17 Cal. 3d. 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976).
2. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1970).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 241 (West 1970).
5. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1972):
After certification to the Governor as provided in this article a court
may commit to the authority any person convicted of a public offense
who comes within subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), or subdivisions (a), (b),
and (d), below:
(a) Is found to be less than 21 years of age at the time of apprehen-
sion.
(b) Is not sentenced to death, imprisonment for life, imprisonment
for 90 days or less, or the payment of a fine, or after having been
directed to pay a fine, defaults in payment thereof, and is subject to
imprisonment for more than 90 days under the judgment.
(c) Is not granted probation.
(d) Was granted probation and probation is revoked and terminated.
The Youth Authority shall accept a person committed to it pursuant
to this article if it believes that the person can be materially benefited
by its reformatory and educational discipline, and if it has adequate
facilities to provide such care.
6. Since juveniles must be at least 16 years of age before they can be
referred to the criminal courts for prosecution and conviction of a public of-
fense, CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1977), the sub-class of
sion may be committed to the California Youth Authority. Wel-
fare and Institutions Code Section 17707 provides that, for mis-
demeanants, such a commitment shall last two years or until the
youth reaches ages 23, whichever occurs later. Jesus was 19
years old at the time of his conviction and the judge ordered him
committed to the Youth Authority. This meant that at the time
of judgment Jesus faced the possibility of incarceration in a
Youth Authority institution for more than three years.8 Even if
he were released prior to this time, which was highly probable,9
Jesus would have been placed on parole for the remainder of his
commitment. 10 On the other hand, if the judge had chosen in-
stead to sentence him to a term of six months in the county jail,
Jesus would have faced a maximum confinement term of only
90 days: the 90 days he had already spent in custody awaiting
trial would have been credited to any jail sentence imposed."
Jesus appealed from his commitment to the Youth Authority
on the grounds that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment
and that it infringed on his right of personal liberty, thereby
denying him the equal protection of the laws. The California
Supreme Court, in bank, in an opinion by Chief Justice Wright,
unanimously sustained the equal protection challenge,12 holding
unconstitutional Section 177013 "insofar as it authorized the
persons who may be committed to the Youth Authority under section 1731.5 is
limited to individuals between the ages of 16 and 21 years.
7. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1770 (West 1972):
"Every person convicted of a misdemeanor and committed to the authority
shall be discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control or when
the person reaches his 23d birthday, whichever occurs later, unless an order for
further detention has been made by the committing court pursuant to article 6
(commencing with Section 1800) of Chapter 1 of Division 2.5."
Sections 1800-1803 provide for further detention of a Youth Authority commit-
ment upon a showing that he would be physically dangerous to the public
because of a mental or physical deficiency or abnormality. A jury trial is pro-
vided on the issue of dangerousness. For a complete discussion see note, A
Dangerous Commitment, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117 (1974).
8. Virtually all persons between the ages of 16 and 21 years who were
convicted of a misdemeanor similarly faced the threat of longer periods of
incarceration when committed to the Youth Authority than did their counter-
parts who drew county jail sentences instead or than did like offenders who
were over the age of 21 at the time of their apprehension. For example, under
the minimum two year provision of section 1770, the shortest control period for
a misdemeanant committed to the Youth Authority is twice as long as the one
year maximum permissible county jail sentence for a misdemeanor. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 19a (West 1970).
9. The mean length of stay in Youth Authority institutions prior to release
on parole for both the calendar year of 1975 and the fiscal year of 1975-1976 (July
1 to July 1) was 12.7 months. DIVISION OF RESEARCH, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH AUTHORITY, MONTHLY STATISTICAL SUMMARY table XI
(July 1976).
10. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1766 (West 1972).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.6 (West Supp. 1977).
12. 17 Cal. 3d 236,243-51,551 P.2d 375, 379-84, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 59-64 (1976).
13. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1770 (West 1972).
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Youth Authority to maintain control over misdemeanants com-
mitted to its care for any period of time in excess of the max-
imum jail term permitted by statute for the offense or offenses
committed. ' 14 Since Jesus had been confined in a Youth Au-
thority institution for more than six months, the maximum
county jail term, the court modified the trial court judgment by
ordering that Jesus be released from custody, if not otherwise
under a lawful restraint, and that his commitment to the Youth
Authority be terminated. As so modified, the court affirmed the
judgment. 15
Virtually every state16 and federal 17 court that has entertained
a challenge to a youthful offender sentencing scheme closely
akin to California's has upheld longer sentences imposed on
youthful offenders. For example, a plethora of federal cases
from nearly every circuit 8 has upheld a similar provision under
the Federal Youth Corrections Act. 9 This provision authorizes
the incarceration of youthful offenders between the ages of 18
and 22 years for an indeterminate term with a possible max-
imum of six years and an automatic conditional release after
four years even though the maximum adult jail sentence for a
federal misdemeanor is one year.2 °
The seminal federal case is Cunningham v. United States.21
The defendant there, a misdemeanant under 21 years old, ap-
pealed his commitment under the Federal Youth Corrections
Act on the grounds that his incarceration beyond the adult
maximum of one year, which he had already served, constituted
14. 17 Cal. 3d at 257, 551 P.2d at 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
15. Id.
16. E.g., Smith v. Sargent, 305 A. 2d 273 (Me. 1973); In re K.V.N., 116 N.J.
Super. 580, 283 A.2d 337 (1971); Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969); State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 3 (1949).
17. See infra note 18.
18. E.g., Caldwell v. United States, 435 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1970); Abernathy
v. United States, 418 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Rehfield, 416 F.2d
273 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 996 (1970); United States v. Dancis, 406
F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1019 (1969); Johnson v. United States, 374
F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1967); Brisco v. United States, 368 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1966); Kotz
v. United States, 353 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1965); Carter v. United States, 113 U.S.
App. D.C. 123, 306 F.2d 283 (1962); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467
(5th Cir. 1958).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b), 5017(c) (1970).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
21. 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958).
cruel and unusual punishment and violated his due process
rights. The Court rejected these arguments, relying primarily
on earlier state court decisions upholding similar sentencing
schemes.22 At the close of the opinion, without request, the court
also raised and briefly reviewed an equal protection challenge
to the sentencing scheme. Relying on two earlier California
decisions23 and on Minnesota v. Probate Court,24 a United
States Supreme Court decision, the court held that the classifi-
cations created by the legislation in question were valid under
the rational basis standard of review.
The rationale uniformly expressed by the courts for justifying
longer sentences for youthful offenders was succinctly stated
by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger in Carter v. United
States,26 a decision reaffirming the holding in Cunningham v.
United States:
[T]he basic theory of that Act is rehabilitative and in a sense this
rehabilitation may be regarded as comprising the quid pro quo for a
longer confinement but under different conditions and terms than a
defendant would undergo in an ordinary prison. The reasoning of the
Cunningham court is relevant in this connection. The court there
noted that the Youth Correction Act 'provides for and affords youth-
ful offenders, . . . not heavier penalties and punishment than are
imposed upon adult offenders, but the opportunity to escape from the
physical and psychological shocks and traumas attendant upon serv-
ing an ordinary penal sentence while obtaining the benefits of correc-
tive treatment, looking to rehabilitation and social redemption and
restoration.'
27
22. Id. at 472.
23. In re Herrera, 23 Cal. 2d 206, 143 P. 2d 345 (1943); Ex parte Liddell, 93
Cal. 633 (1892).
24. 309 U.S. 270 (1940). The case involved a due process and equal protec-
tion challenge to a psychopathic sex offender commitment statute. The Court
ultimately upheld the statute. On the equal protection issue the Court applied
the rational basis standard of review.
25. 256 F.2d at 473.
26. 306 F.2d 283 (1962).
27. Id. at 285.
The United States Supreme Court to date has declined to review the question
of longer sentences imposed upon youthful offenders. The Court's focus in the
area of juvenile justice has been centered on according the same procedural
safeguards to the juvenile during the adjudication stage of the proceedings as
are enjoyed by adults in criminal prosecutions. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975) (double jeopardy clause extended to juvenile proceedings); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (reasonable doubt standard held applicable to juvenile ad-
judicatory hearing); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to notice of charges, right
to counsel, right to confrontation of witnesses, and right to privilege against self
incrimination granted to juveniles at adjudicatory hearing); but see McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (right of jury trial denied to juveniles). In the
seminal case of In re Gault, the defendant was adjudged a juvenile delinquent
and committed to a state reformatory for the remainder of his minority, a period
in excess of five years, for committing an offense punishable by a maximum
adult imprisonment sentence of two months. The court specifically declined to
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The most important local precedent facing the Olivas court
was In re Herrera,28 an earlier California Supreme Court deci-
sion which upheld the sentencing scheme in question.29 Each of
the three petitioners in Herrera was committed to the Youth
Authority after two had plead guilty to misdemeanor assault
and one had been found guilty of aggravated assault, a felony.
The petitioners sought their discharges on the ground that the
Youth Correction Authority Act" was unconstitutional, inter
alia, because the classifications created by Section 1731.5 re-
garding age31 and other commitment eligibility criteria were
"unreasonable" and thus constituted denials of equal protec-
tion. It was also urged that the Act was "unreasonably dis-
criminatory 3 2 because of the potentially longer period of in-
carceration prescribed for Youth Authority Commitments un-
der Section 1770.
The court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice
Traynor, applied the rational basis test to the eligibility classifi-
cations and concluded that they Were reasonably drawn, there-
by rejecting the challenge to Section 1731.5 .33 In reference to the
age classification the court stated:
The Great value in treatment of youthful offenders lies in the timeli-
ness in striking at the roots of recidivism. Reaching the offender
during his formative years, it can be an impressive bulwark against
the confirmed criminality that defies rehabilitation, for it is charac-
review the sentencing stage of the juvenile proceedings although it did recognize
that the deprivation of liberty resulting from the "commitment" of a juvenile
offender is analogous to imprisonment imposed on adult offenders. 387 U.S. at
36. Thus, the Gault court implicitly appears to have assumed the validity of
confining youthful offenders for longer periods than adults for the same con-
duct. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
28. 23 Cal. 2d 206, 143 P.2d 245 (1943).
29. The issue of the constitutional validity of longer sentences for youthful
misdemeamants was upheld by the California Supreme Court on three occa-
sions prior to the turn of the century. Ex parte Nichols, 110 Cal. 651, 43 P. 9
(1896); Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 29 P. 251 (1892); Boys and Girls Aid Society
v. Reis, 71 Cal. 627, 12 P. 796 (1887). In Liddell and Nichols the court entertained
and rejected equal protection challenges brought against sentencing statutes
which required a minor who was convicted of a misdemeanor to serve a reform-
atory sentence longer than a county jail sentence for the same offense.
30. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE §§ 1700 et seq. (West 1972), added by Cal.
Stat's ch. 937, p. 2522 (1941).
31. 23 Cal. 2d at 212-13, 143 P. 2d at 248.
32. Id. at 213, 143 P.2d at 248-49.
33. Id., 143 P.2d at 248-49.
teristic of youth to be responsive to good influence as it is susceptible
to bad.
3 4
The court proceeded to summarily reject the challenge to Sec-
tion 1770 by merely stating that "[t]his contention is answered
by the many cases upholding similar provisions with respect to
juvenile offenders. '35
The Olivas court stated that its sole rationale for reconsider-
ing the validity of the holding in Herrera and for its disapproval
of that case was that the standard of review applied by the
Herrera court, the rational basis test, had since become out-
moded in cases like the present one where a fundamental right
is involved. 36 The court concluded that Herrera contained a
"major constitutional infirmity" 37 because it was decided before
the full development of the fundamental interest analysis and
the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review. On this point the
court stated in part:
It is not without significance that Herrera was decided long before
fundamental interest analysis and the strict scrutiny standard became
fully delineated tools for use in constitutional evaluation. The analysis
undertaken in Herrera was much different from that we engage in
today .... While the malleability of youth noted in Herrera may have
remained fairly constant through the intervening years, constitutional
analysis has undergone considerable metamorphosis. Where once
merely reasonable classifications were sufficient, the state must now
show a compelling interest if fundamental rights are affected as in the
present case.
38
The court is, of course, correct in its observation that equal
protection analysis in the fundamental interest area has under-
gone considerable development since it was first introduced one
year prior to Herrera in Skinner v. Oklahoma.39 The court went
one step further, however, and urged that this development in
the law was the catalyst for the court's rejection of Herrera.
This additional step strongly implies that judicial authority ex-
ists which recognizes that when a classification scheme oper-
ates to deprive one group of its individual liberty for a longer
period than it deprives another, similar group, a fundamental
right has been affected and that the stricter standard of review
34. Id., 143 P.2d at 248.
35. Id. at 213-14, 143 P.2d at 249. The court cited, inter alia, the three
nineteenth century California Supreme Court decisions discussed supra note
29.
36. 17 Cal. 3d at 252, 551 P.2d at 385, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
37. Id. at 253, 551 P.2d at 386, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
The Olivas court also used the "constitutional infirmity" contention to
disapprove Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958) and its
progeny. 17 Cal. 3d at 252-54, 551 P.2d at 386-87, 131 Cal. Rptr. 66-67.
38. Id. at 252, 551 P.2d at 385, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
39. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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is therefore required. However, as discussed below, the case
authority is so meager in support of this proposition that, as an
appellate court decision, Olivas can be said to have broken new
ground by declaring personal liberty to be a fundamental inter-
est necessitating a strict scrutiny level of review. Thus the "con-
stitutional infirmity" contention, when closely examined, only
explains the method the court employed in striking down the
sentencing scheme in Olivas but does not, as intended, offer a
plausible rationale for prompting the court to do so.
First, it bears noting that the rational basis test is still a viable
analytical tool in the general area of unequal deprivations of
personal liberty as is represented by the recent United States
Supreme Court decision of McGinnis v. Royster. ° In McGinnis
an equal protection challenge was brought by two state prison-
ers against a New York penal law which denied "good time"
credit towards parole eligibility for presentence county jail in-
carceration. However, those persons who were released on bail
prior to sentencing received "good time" credit for the entire
period of their prison confinements. Had the petitioners re-
ceived "good time" credit for their county jail confinements
they would have been able to appear before the parole board
four and three months earlier, respectively. A three-judge dis-
trict court4 ' held that the scheme lacked any rational basis and
thus violated the requirements of the equal protection clause.
However, the Supreme Court, also applying the rational basis
test, upheld the law in a seven to two decision.42 The dissent
agreed that the rationale basis test was the standard of review
but disagreed with the majority's result.4 3
The Olivas court held that "personal liberty is a fundamental'
interest, second only to life itself. '44 The court narrowly defined
personal liberty as the freedom from involuntary incarceration
as well as the freedom from the restraints that accompany
parole.4 5 The court was able to muster only two federal district
40. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
41. McGinnis v. Royster, 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
42. 410 U.S. at 277.
43. Id. at 278-283.
44. 17 Cal. 3d at 251, 551 P.2d at 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
45. Id. at 245, 551 P.2d at 380-81, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61. For the standard
parole conditions see infra note 114.
[VOL. 4:389, 1977] People v. Olivas
court cases purporting to declare such an interest to be funda-
mental for equal protection analysis.
The first, Robinson v. York, 46 involved a petition to the district
court for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a woman serving a
Connecticut reformatory sentence. The court granted the writ
and sustainted her equal protection challenge to a commitment
statute which permitted women to be imprisoned for longer
periods than men convicted of the same offenses. 47 Toward the
end of a rather rambling opinion Judge Blumenfield stated:
"Among the rights protected by the Constitution next to life
itself, none is more basic than liberty. ' 48 The Olivas court seized
upon this statement and concluded that the strict scrutiny test
was applied in York because liberty had been recognized as a
fundamental interest.49 However, a close reading of York re-
veals that this conclusion is erroneous. It is apparent that Judge
Blumenfield applied the stricter standard of review to the law
on a "suspect classification" theory rather than on a fundamen-
tal interest theory as the Olivas court asserted. In determining
the appropriate standard of review, Judge Blumenfield drew an
analogy between classifications based on sex and suspect clas-
sifications based on race5 when he stated:
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly determined whether equal
protection rights of women should be tested by this rigid standard, the
strict scrutiny test, it is difficult to find any reason why adult women,
as one of the specific groups that compose humanity, should have a
lesser measure of protection than a racial group.51
-- The second case cited by the Olivas court does lend support to
the fundamental interest approach. In Bolling v. Manson5 2 a
class action was brought by certain reformatory inmates to
enjoin the enforcement of a Connecticut statutory scheme that
denied "good time" credit to youthful offenders and women
serving "indefinite" reformatory sentences while granting such
credit to similar inmates who were serving "definite" sentences
in the same institutions. Relying primarily on several funda-
The court indicated that the concept of "personal liberty" did not extend to
slight impingements on a person's freedom of action such as the age minimum
placed on the purchase and consumption of alcholic beverages or slightly differ-
ent conditions of probation or parole. Id. at 253, 551 P.2d at 386, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
66.
46. 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id. at 16.
49. 17 Cal. 3d at 247, 551 P.2d at 382, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
50. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
51. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8,14 (D. Conn. 1968).
52. 345 F. Supp. 48 (D. Conn. 1972).
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mental rights decisions of the United States Supreme Court53
and on Robinson v. York, 54 the three-judge district court, with-
out discussion, held that the classifications in question im-
pinged "directly on personal liberty, one of the most fundamen-
tal rights of the individual. ' 55 The court then applied the strict
scrutiny test and held that the statute violated the mandates of
the equal protection clause. 6
To bolster this meager direct case authority, the Olivas court
drew from a number of other sources in an effort to prove that
the concept of personal liberty, as they had defined it, had long
been recognized in American jurisprudence as an important
individual right. The court noted that the origins of the concept
"can be traced as far back in Anglo American history as the
[13th Century] Magna Carta" 57 and that the concept was later
embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment as well as in the due process5 8 and unanimous jury ver-
dict 9 provisions of the California Constitution.60 The court also
contended that the "fundamental importance of personal liber-
ty" 61 is implicit in the various due process guarantees accorded
to criminal defendants by numerous decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.6 2 The court added to this list of support-
53. Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety, 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (right to fami-
lial recognition of an illegitimate child); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
•(1966) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right of procrea-
tion).
54. 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
55. Boling v. Manson, 345 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D. Conn. 1972).
56. Id. at 52.
Note that the significance of the Bolling court's approach and result is diluted
by the fact that when applying the strict scrutiny test the court held that not only
did the state lack a compelling interest for treating the two groups differently,
but the scheme also lacked any rational basis. Id. at 51. Thus, the statute, unlike
the scheme reviewed in Olivas, could have been struck down without utilizing
the fundamental interest approach.
57. 17 Cal. 3d at 248, 551 P.2d at 383, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
58. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
59. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
60. 17 Cal. 3d at 250, 551 P.2d at 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
61. Id. at 249, 551 P.2d at 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
62. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (right to impartial jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965) (confrontation of one's accusers); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (right to counsel); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to notice of the
ing authorities several recent California Supreme Court deci-
sions which extended the right to jury trials 63 and the "reason-
able doubt" standard of proof6 4 to involuntary civil commitment
hearings.
65
After declaring "personal liberty" to be a fundamental inter-
est and concluding that the sentencing scheme in question af-
fected this interest, all that remained for the court was to apply
the potent strict scrutiny test to the law. Under this test the
burden is, of course, shifted to the state to "first establish that it
has a compelling interest which justifies the law and then dem-
onstrate that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to
further that purpose. '66
The People's primary defense in support of the unequal sen-
tencing scheme rested on the theory of rehabilitation 6 7-the
rationale traditionally relied upon by the courts in upholding
longer sentences for youthful offenders. 68 In applying the com-
pelling interest standard to this contention, the court concluded
that the state's interest in the rehabilitation of youthful offend-
ers was not an adequate "quid pro quo '69 to justify the longer
sentences imposed on misdemeanants committed to the Youth
Authority; the loss of personal liberty suffered by the latter
group was too onerous to be exchanged for the goal of rehabili-
tation.70 In support of this conclusion the court stated in part:
Irrespective of whatever amenities are provided to a ward confined in
an institution of the Youth Authority in order to differentiate the
quality of his incarceration from those persons confined to a county
jail or state prison, the plain and simple fact remains that he cannot
leave of his own free will. His daily routine is regimented, his personal
habits and intimate private matters are subject to the scrutiny of
others; in short his life is completely controlled in a most basic sense. 71
Applying the second portion of the strict scrutiny test, the
court held that the People failed to demonstrate how the state's
interest in rehabilitation, assuming it is compelling, was fur-
thered by prescribing longer sentences for youthful offenders. 72
charges and right to public trial); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941)
(criminal trial must proceed with fundamental fairness).
63. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975);
In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
64. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975).
65. 17 Cal. 3d at 250, 551 P.2d at 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
66. Id. at 251, 551 P. 2d at 385, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
67. Id. at 252-53, 551 P.2d at 385-86, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
68. See text accompanying notes 26 and 27 supra.
69. 17 Cal. 3d at 253, 551 P.2d at 386, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
70. Id. at 253-54, 551 P.2d at 386, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 255, 551 P.2d at 387, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
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The People's major argument 73 was that Section 1770 sets forth
the "minimum period of confinement for rehabilitation. 7 4 The
court responded to this contention by stating that there was no
way to "determine what minimum period of confinement is
sufficient to achieve the state's goal of meaningful rehabilita-
tion. ' 75 This discussion was terminated by contrasting Section
1770 with the recently amended portion of the Federal Youth
Corrections Act 76 which authorizes the commitment of juvenile
offenders until they reach 21 years or for the maximum term
which could have been imposed on an adult convicted of the
same offense, whichever is sooner. The court stated that
[Slince the purpose of the Federal Youth Corrections Act is to substi-
tute rehabilitation for punishment in a manner similar to the Califor-
nia legislation, it cannot now be argued that youthful California mis-
demeanants necessarily require longer rehabilitative detention.
There has been no showing made that youthful offenders necessarily
require longer periods of confinement for rehabilitative purposes
than older adults. 7
7
By holding that the goal of rehabilitation does not constitute a
compelling state interest, the Olivas court substantially depre-
ciated the importance of the rehabilitation ideal which, since
before the turn of the century in California, 78 has been consid-
ered to outweigh and justify any greater loss of individual liber-
ty imposed on youthful offenders. It is interesting to note in this
regard that the Olivas court took care in the opinion to express
its complete endorsement of and belief in the rehabilitation
ideal and in its implementation. 79 However, the result in Olivas
defies the sincerity of these sentiments. The inescapable conclu-
sion is that a change in the court's attitude toward the practical
administration of the rehabilitation ideal rather than any in-
terim changes in the law resulted in the rejection of the sentenc-
ing scheme upheld over thirty years earlier.80 The decision
73. The People also argued (without success) that a juvenile offender may
have his conviction expunged after his release from the Youth Authority's
control, thereby relieving him of the disabilities that may otherwise follow a
misdemeanant. Id. at 256, 551 P.2d at 388, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
74. Id. at 255, 551 P.2d at 387, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
75. Id.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
77. 17 Cal. 3d at 255-56, 551 P.2d at 388, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
78. See supra note 29.
79. 17 Cal. 3d at 251-52, 257, 551 P.2d at 385, 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 65, 69.
80. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
manifests the court's realization that the rehabilitation ideal-
despite all honest efforts-still remains only an ideal and not a
reality.81 Thus, the nature of the longer periods of incarceration
imposed on youthful offenders under the guise of "rehabilita-
tion" is implicitly exposed in Olivas as what it always has
been-greater punishment for committing the same prohibited
conduct.
- The ramifications of the Olivas decision were felt almost im-
mediately by the Department of the Youth Authority. Shortly
after the decision was handed down the California Supreme
Court ordered the Authority to release from its control all mis-
demeanants who had been under its jurisdiction for periods
equal to the maximum permissible county jail terms for their
particular offenses. 82 The court added that Olivas also applied
to so called "wobblers," 83 that is, to offenses governed by Penal
Code Section 1784 which provides that when an offense is pun-
ishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony, in the discretion
that the court, and the defendant is committed to the Youth
Authority, the offense is deemed to be a misdemeanor. How-
ever, the court stayed the order to allow the legislature time to
enact an amendment to Section 17.85
Penal Code Section 17 was amended86 and became effective
on August 31, 1976. As amended, it gave the trial court the
81. The California Legislature has clearly reached this realization as is
evidenced by the recent passage of the "definite" sentencing act. S.B. 42, Cal.
Stat's ch. 1139, p. 4752 (1976) (effective July 1, 1977). The new law declares
"punishment" to be the purpose of imprisonment and, among other things, puts
an end to the existing "indefinite" felony sentencing in California-which has
been based on the principle of "rehabilitation"-and replaces it with fixed
prison and parole terms for most felonies. Id.
82. Department of Youth Authority, Staff News, September 17, 1976, at 1,
Col. 1 [hereinafter cited to as Staff News].
83. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Sept. 4, 1976, Part A, at 2, Col. 6.
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part:
(b) When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by
imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the
county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following
circumstances:
(2) When the court commits the defendant to the Youth Authority.
85. Herald Examiner, supra note 83.
Compliance with the latter part of the order meant that the Youth Authority
would have been forced to release from incarceration between 450 and 500
youthful offenders convicted of such serious crimes as assault with a deadly
weapon and second degree burglary. Id.; Staff News, supra note 82, at 2, col. 2.
The practical effect of such a ruling would also force judges to send youthful
offenders convicted of "wobblers" to state prison if they felt that such offenders
needed more than one year's imprisonment.
86. Cal. Stat's ch. 1070, p. 4508 (1976).
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option of characterizing a "wobbler" offense as a misdemeanor
upon committing the defendant to the Youth Authority or of
simply committing the defendant to the Youth Authority with-
out characterizing the offense at all, in which case the offense
would automatically be deemed to be misdemeanor upon the
defendant's discharge from the Authority.87 These changes ap-
parently mean, in light of Olivas, that when the trial court
chooses to designate the offense as a misdemeanor, the result
would be the same as that reached under the older version of
Penal Code Section 17: the defendant may remain under the
jurisdiction of the Youth Authority for a maximum period of
only one year, the maximum permissible county jail sentence
for a misdemeanor.8 But if the trial court declines to charac-
terize it, the offense will then be treated as a felony while the
defendant is under the jurisdiction of the Youth Authority. 89
This would change the permissible length of the commitment to
coincide with the maximum state prison sentence that could be
imposed for the offense as a felony. 90
87. Id. The amended portion of Section 17 now reads:
(b) When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by
imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the
county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following
circumstances:
(2) When the court, upon committing the defendant to the Youth Au-
thority, designates the offense to be a misdemeanor.
(c) When a defendant is committed to the Youth Authority for a crime
punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state
prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, the offense shall,
upon discharge of the defendant from the Youth Authority, thereafter
be deemed a misdemeanor for all purposes.
88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19a (West 1970).
89. This interpretation is derived from the construction placed on Section
17 in its pre-1947 form which made no reference to the character of a "wobbler"
when the defendant was committed to the Youth Authority. People v. Williams,
27 Cal. 2d 220, 163 P.2d 692 (1945); 31 OP. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 200 (1958). It rests on
the doctrine that if neither a state prison nor a county jail sentence is imposed
for a "wobbler" offense the defendant retains the status of a person convicted of
a felony. See People v. Zaccaria, 216 Cal. App. 2d 787, 131 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1963);
C. FRICKE, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 9-10 (10th ed. 1970).
90. The paradoxical effect of the Olivas decision and subsequent order by
the court culminating in the amendment to Section 17 moves the maximum
jurisdiction age for "wobbler" commitments from 23 years under the misde-
meanor commitment section, CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1770 (West 1972), to 25
years under the felony commitment section, CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1771
(West 1972). See text, infra, accompanying note 93.
The amendment to Penal Code Section 17 was expressly made
applicable to all Youth Authority commitments then under the
Department's jurisdiction." Apparently, the California Su-
preme Court was satisfied with the effect of the changes and the
retroactive operation of the amendment for it subsequently de-
leted the inclusion of "wobblers" in its original order and rein-
stated the order demanding the release of "pure" misdemean-
ants.92
Several important issues not reviewed in Olivas but related
thereto were later rendered moot by the Youth Authority's com-
pliance with the California Attorney General's broad interpre-
tation of Olivas. The Authority announced in an open letter to
all wards93 that, based on the Attorney General's opinion, it was
extending the application of Olivas to include felony commit-
ments from the adult courts. Thus, jurisdiction of felony com-
mitments, including "wobblers," would be limited to the max-
imum period of the state prison sentence prescribed for the
offense committed.9 4 The upper limit of such commitments
would be governed by the offender's 25th birthday under Wel-
fare and Institutions Code Section 1771.95
In this same letter it was also pronounced that, in computing
jurisdiction dates, misdemeanor and felony commitments
would receive credit for all jail time served with respect to the
offense committed.9 6 Such "back time" credit is presently
granted under the Penal Code to misdemeanants sentenced to
county jail97 and to felons sentenced to state prison.9 8 These
91. Cal. Stat's ch. 1070, p. 4508 (1976).
92. Staff News, supra note 82, at 2, col. 2.
93. Letter from C.A. Terhune, Deputy Director, California Department of
Youth Authority, to All Youth Authority Wards, October 8, 1976 [hereinafter
cited to as Letter to Wards.]
94. Id. at 1.
95. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1771 (West 1972):
Every person convicted of a felony and committed to the authority
shall be discharged when such person reaches his 25th birthday [unless
an order for further detention is made after a hearing finding ward to
be a danger to the public under Sections 1780-83 or 1800-03].
96. Letter to Wards, supra note 93, at 2.
97. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.6 (West Supp. 1977) (effective 1972).
The Olivas court pointed out in several footnotes the fact that the 90 days
presentence time served by the defendant would have been credited to reduce
any county jail sentence imposed, thus comparatively resulting in an even great-
er sentence length for the defendant than the maximum county jail term. 17 Cal.
3d at 343-44 nn. 9 & 10, 551 P.2d at 378 nn. 9 & 10, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 58 nn. 9 & 10.
See text, supra accompanying note 11. However, this appears to be only dicta
because the specific holding of the case is limited to equalizing misdemeanor
Youth Authority commitment terms with maximum county jail sentences with-
out reference to "back time" credit. See text, supra, accompanying note 14.
98. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5 (West Supp. 1977).
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sections provide credit for all days served while the defendant is
in custody from the date of arrest until the sentence com-
mences. However, no comparable statute grants such "back
time" credit to Youth Authority commitments and it has never
before been granted by the Department. Moreover, as recently
as 1975, in In re Keel,99 a California court of appeal refused to
construe Penal Code Section 2900.5100 as applicable to felony
commitments to the Youth Authority. The denial of "back time"
credit to such commitments was held not to have even raised an
equal protection issue for review. 10
1
The Keel court's avoidance of the equal protection issue was,
however, hardly justifiable when it is understood that felons
committed to the Youth Authority and felons sent to state pris-
ons are each sub-classes of the larger class of felons convicted in
the adult courts, and that granting or denying the benefit of
"back time" credit affects the personal liberty of each sub-class
in an identical manner insofar as the reduction of the maximum
sentence imposed is concerned. Thus, the two groups are not
only sufficiently similarly situated to raise an equal protection
question, but because the unequal treatment affects personal
liberties the state should now have to demonstrate a compelling
interest before denying the benefit to Youth Authority commit-
ments. Since it is apparent that the denials are based on the
state's interest in rehabilitation, "back time" credit would have
undoubtedly been granted upon review by the California Su-
preme Court.
The Olivas court expressly reserved for a proper case the
issue of the validity of juvenile court commitments to the Youth
Authority 10 2 which extend beyond the maximum county jail
sentence that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the
99. 53 Cal. App. 3d 70, 125 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1975).
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5 (West Supp. 1977) (felony back time credit
section, effective 1972).
101. 53 Cal. App. 3d at 77, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
The Keel court based this holding on the lack of a "minimum parole eligibility
date" for Youth Authority commitments as compared with the existence of such
a date for felons sentenced to state prison. Id. at 73, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
102. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1736 (West 1972):
The juvenile court may in its discretion commit persons subject to its
jurisdiction to the Authority, and the Authority may in its discretion
accept such commitments.
identical offense.103 Consistent with this reservation, the De-
partment of the Youth Authority to date has declined to extend
the Olivas holding to include commitments from the juvenile
courts. Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1769104 provides
that commitments from the juvenile courts shall be for a period
of two years or until the youth reaches age 21, whichever occurs
later. Thus, when a minor is adjudged to be "a ward of the
court"'0 ° and is comitted to the Youth Authority for an offense
that is punishable as a "pure" misdemeanor in adult court, he is
deprived of his personal liberty, at the minimum, for twice as
long as the maximum permissible county jail sentence. 10 6 It
would appear, therefore, that this scheme raises the same equal
protection issue as did the scheme in Olivas.
This issue remains despite the fact that comprehensive
juvenile justice legislation, 10 7 passed subsequent to Olivas and
effective January 1, 1977, included provisions'08 limiting the
physical confinement of minors to adult maximums. An addi-
tion to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 731109 provides
that a minor who has been adjudged to be a ward of the juvenile
court for having perpetrated a criminal offense and who has
been committed to the Youth Authority shall not be incarcer-
ated beyond the maximum term of imprisionment which could
be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. The
addition further provides, 0 however, that the Youth Authority
may retain these -wards on parole status for the maximum
period specified by Section 1769."' As a consequence of the new
law a ward may thus be incarcerated for the maximum period
of the county jail term prescribed for that offense and there-
after released on parole to serve the remainder of his minimum
103. 17 Cal. 3d at 243 n. 11, 551 P.2d at 379 n. 11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 59 n. 11.
104. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 1769 (West 1972):
Every person committed to the authority by a juvenile court shall be
discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control or when
the person reaches his 21st birthday, whichever occurs later, unless an
order for further detention has been made by the committing court
pursuant to Article 6 (commencing with Section 1800).
105. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1977).
106. See supra note 8.
107. Cal. Stat's chs. 1068-1071, p. 4453 (1976).
108. Id., ch. 1071 §§ 29, 30 at 4527-29.
109. Id. § 30 at 4529.
110. Id.
111. See supra note 104. Section 1769 was amended this same session by
adding a provision extending Youth Authority jurisdiction over juvenile court
commitments 16 years of age or older who commit certain serious felonies to
their 23rd birthday or for two years, whichever occurs later. Cal. Stat's ch. 1071 §
34, p. 4530 (1976).
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two year sentence.' 2 As will be recalled, 1 3 the Oliva& court
included parole status within its definition of a deprivation of
personal liberty."
4
The recent legislation has not only left intact the issue of
longer sentences for juvenile court commitments reserved by
the Olivas decision" 5 but it has also fallen short in its attempt to
equalize juvenile incarceration periods with adult maximums
when a minor is confined prior to the disposition of his case by
the juvenile court. The legislation made no additions expressly
granting "back time" credit' 6 to minors and the Department of
the Youth Authority has not construed the addition to Section
731 as requiring such credit for the purpose of reducing the
maximum incarceration period. This has produced the possibil-
ity of a longer incarceration term for a minor who is confined
prior to trial and to a disposition committing him to the Youth
Authority than for an adult who is sentenced to imprisonment
for the same offense but who is automatically granted presen-
tence credit by statute." 7
A second possible issue concerning juvenile court commit-
ments also remains subject to challenge. This issue arose as a
result of the Youth Authority's compliance with the Attorney
112. It is obvious that for the two year provision to apply the defendant must
have reached his 19th birthday at the time of his commitment. The two year
minimum is the exception rather than the rule considering that the average age
at commitment during 1975 for a juvenile court ward was 16.2 years. STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF THE YOUTH AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT, PROGRAM
DESCRIPTION AND STATISTICAL SUMMARY 1975 table 5, at 19 (1976). The rule is
therefore commitment lengths substantially in excess of two years.
113. See text, supra, accompanying notes 44 and 45.
114. The standard parole conditions require, among other things, that a
parolee follow all the instructions of his parole agent including participating in a
selected education, employment or training program, refraining from changing
his residence or leaving the state without the agent's consent, and submitting to
any medical or psychiatric examinations as the Authority directs. STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF THE YOUTH AUTHORITY, YOUTH AUTHORITY BOARD
POLICY MANUAL Appendix F (1974). In addition to the standard conditions,
"special conditions" may be ordered by the Youth Authority Board. Id. The
consequence of violating a parole condition may result in a temporary detention
for up to 30 days, id., or even a return to a Youth Authority institution for the
remainder of the parolee's commitment term. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE §§ 1177,
1767.3 (West 1972).
115. See text, supra, accompanying note 102.
116. For a discussion of "back time" credit see text, supra, accompanying
notes 96-98.
117. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2900.5, 2900.6 (West Supp. 1977).
General's interpretation of the Olivas decision: the Authority
has granted "back time" credit to adult court commitments to
reduce their jurisdictional terms but has denied this credit to
juvenile court commitments.11 8
Since the major justification for imposing longer sentences on
juvenile court commitments for misdemeanor offenses'1 9 and
for denying them "back time" credit obviously rests on the
rehabilitation ideal, it is unnecessary to demonstrate that, based
on the reasoning of Olivas, this unequal treatment will not
withstand the strict scrutiny test. This prediction is sound even
though the issues may raise threshold equal protection ques-
tions not present in Olivas. An argument might be made that
juvenile court commitments are not similarly situated with
adult misdemeanants because minors are tried in a different
court and are not deemed to be convicted of public offenses.
However, regardless of the procedural distinctions, both groups
ultimately suffer similar deprivations of personal liberties120 for
having committed the same prohibited acts and, as in Olivas,
one group will be forced to suffer a longer loss of liberty be-
cause of a classification based upon age. Thus, the two groups
are similarly situated for equal protection purposes.1 21
A final and more general question to be briefly explored con-
cerns the possible limitations, if any, which might be placed on
the newly enunciated personal liberty approach. This approach
has potentially broad application as a remedy for eradicating
any inequities presently existing in California's penal sentenc-
ing scheme which are based on arbitrary criteria (such as age),
whether they involve a class of youthful offenders, as in Olivas,
or a class of adult offenders. For example, the approach seems
applicable to the extreme situation of an adult who is convicted
118. See text, supra, accompanying note 96.
119. Many Youth Authority commitments from the juvenile courts for
felony offenses may also be serving longer sentences than adults sentenced to
prison because the prison terms specified in the new "definite" sentencing law
for less serious felonies are only 16 months, 2 or 3 years. Cal. Stat's ch. 1139 § 98,
p. 4776 (1976) (operative July 1, 1977). Moreover, the Authority's plans to date for
implementing the "definite" sentencing law in terms of computing jurisdictional
dates for adult court commitments and incarceration periods for juvenile court
commitments do not include granting "good time" credit, a procedure which
was established in the new law to automatically reduce by one-third adult prison
sentences for displaying "good behavior." Id. § 276, p. 4823.
120. Moreover, identical deprivations of liberty are suffered when a youth
is committed to the Youth Authority from a criminal court as the defendant was
in Olivas.
121. See Smith v. Sargent, 305 A.2d 273 (Me. 1973); In re K.V.N., 116 N.J.
Super. 580, 283 A.2d 337 (1971); Smith v. State, 444 S.W. 2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969).
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of kidnapping for ransom with injury to the victim 122 and re-
ceives the maximum sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. 123 In all cases this sentence is for a longer
period than the maximum permissible sentence that can be
imposed on a minor found guilty of the same offense in juvenile
court.124 Thus, it can be argued that all such adults suffer a
greater deprivation of personal liberty than minors similarly
situated solely because of their age. Even assuming that such an
unequal sentencing scheme raises the same equal protection
issue as was found in Olivas, the fundamental practical ques-
tion becomes whether or not the California Supreme Court
would be receptive to such a challenge. The stated rationale in
Olivas offers no indication of any limitations on the new ap-
proach. 125 On the contrary, the rationale seems to imply that the
court is in a posture to accept such a challenge for review and to
apply this "modern" approach to any similar situation of sen-
tencing inequality. 126 However, if there is any validity to the
contention raised in this note'27 that the underlying rationale of
Olivas was primarily based on the court's disillusionment with
the implementation of the rehabilitation ideal, then it appears
likely that restraints will be placed on the new approach making
it available only to the general class of "youthful" offenders as a
remedy for eliminating any sentencing inequalities existing in
this area of the California criminal justice system.
WILLIAM E. HARRIS
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West 1970).
123. Id. Note that the new definite sentencing law does not change the
sentence for this offense.
124. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 731, as amended, Cal. Stat's 1071 § 30, p.
4529 (1976) (commitment to the Youth Authority is the most severe sentence).
125. See text, supra, accompanying notes 36-38.
126. Id.
127. See text, supra, accompanying notes 78-81.

